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Abstract
It’s been argued that fitness cannot always be defined as expected number of off-
spring; different, more complex functions are required for different contexts. Brandon
(1990) argues that fitness therefore merely satisfies a common schema. Other authors
(Ariew and Lewontin, 2004; Krimbas, 2004) argue that no unified mathematical char-
acterization of fitness is possible. I focus on comparative fitness, explaining that though
comparative fitness must be relativized to an evolutionary effect which fitness differ-
ences help cause, thus relativized it can be given a unitary mathematical definition in
terms of probabilities of producing offspring of various types and various other effects.
Fitness will sometimes be defined in terms of probabilities of effects occurring over the
long term, but I argue that these probabilities nevertheless concern effects occurring
over the short term.
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1 Introduction
According to the original version of the propensity interpretation of fitness (PIF) (Brandon,
1978; Mills and Beatty, 1979), biological fitness is a mathematical function of probabili-
ties and numerical values associated with reproductive outcomes, i.e. expected number of
offspring. This approach seems to take fitness to be a real aspect of the process of natural se-
lection, an aspect which is approximated by various fitness and selection coefficient terms in
models of selection, drift, etc. In response to work by Gillespie (1973; 1974; 1975; 1977), some
authors have argued that fitness should sometimes be defined in terms of a more complex
function (Beatty and Finsen, 1989; Brandon, 1990; Sober, 2001). Brandon (1990) argued
that fitness therefore merely satisfies a common schema instantiated by different mathemat-
ical functions More extreme conclusions have been drawn from arguments that fitness must
sometimes be characterized by an even wider variety of mathematical functions because of
conspecifics’ mutual influence on reproductive success (Ariew and Lewontin, 2004; Krimbas,
2004). Despite the heterogeneity of mathematical functions needed to model fitness, I argue
for the following.
As a causal and explanatory factor, fitness must be relativized to an effect or explanandum
to be caused/explained, but as long as the effect is carefully specified, there is a single, often
simple, mathematical property which constitutes the fact that one type is fitter than another.
In particular, for questions about what caused one type or another to be better represented
at the end of an interval of time, a type A is fitter than another type B iff A has a greater
probability of having increased its frequency more than B at the end of that interval.
Though in such cases fitness must be defined in terms of probabilities of reproductive
effects over several generations, I argue that fitness nevertheless has to do with influence in
each generation. Since probabilities of long-term effects can be derived from probabilities
of short-term effects, the former are simply mathematical properties of causes acting in the
short term. These short-term mathematical properties will often be difficult or impossible
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to discover with any precision; that is why they must be modeled by a variety of relatively
simple approximations.
PIF advocates usually claim that the probabilities of which fitness is a function are
propensities, a (proposed) kind of indeterministic disposition. One can criticize this aspect of
the PIF by criticizing the concept of propensity generally,1 or by arguing that if propensities
exist, their behavior doesn’t allow them to play the role that the PIF requires (Abrams,
2007a). Such “Function of what?” problems might be solved by arguing that some other
kind of probability plays the appropriate role. I’ll ignore this kind of problem here, simply
assuming for now that appropriate probabilities—whether propensities or something else—
do exist.
My focus will instead be on what I call the “What function?” problem. This arises
from the question of what mathematical function of probabilities and other factors fitness
might be, and arguments that there is no one function common to all contexts in terms of
which a central notion of fitness should be defined. Sections 2–4 concern “What function?”
problems raised by Gillespie’s work (Gillespie, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1977; Beatty and Finsen,
1989; Brandon, 1990; Sober, 2001) . Section 5 addresses “What function?” challenges raised
by Krimbas (2004) and Ariew and Lewontin (2004).2
I’ll assume that in the final analysis, the kind of fitness relevant to natural selection is
fitness of types , i.e. properties of organisms, since it is types that are heritable and selected
for. Fitness is often attributed to token organisms, but marginal fitnesses of various heritable
types can then be derived by averaging (e.g. Mills and Beatty, 1979; Sober, 1984b, 2001;
Ewens, 2004; Rice, 2004).
1(Eagle, 2004) surveys criticisms of propensity concepts.
2My responses to the “What function?” challenges raised by Krimbas and Ariew and Lewontin actually
involve an answer to a “Function of what?” question, in particular the question of what sorts of outcomes
the probabilities constitutive of fitness concern.
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2 Troubles with expectationalism
As mentioned above, the original PIF defined fitness as the expectation or arithmetic mean
of the number of offspring:
Fitness of A =
∞∑
i=0
i P(OA = i) ,
where “OA = i” says that an organism of type A has i offspring.
3 However, PIF advocates
(Beatty and Finsen, 1989; Brandon, 1990; Sober, 2001) and others have questioned the
original PIF because of Gillespie’s arguments (1973; 1974; 1975; 1977) that a type with a
lower expected number of offspring than another can have a greater probability of long-term
reproductive success. This can happen because the number of organisms of a given type
in one generation is in part a function of the number of organisms previously producing
offspring of that type. This means that the overall shape of the probability distribution
over numbers of offspring, not just its mean, is relevant to long-term evolution. In very
simple cases, the most probable outcome of competition between two types A and B over a
large number of generations n is that A will increase its frequency in the population iff its







In a short discussion (Gillespie, 1977) of his earlier work (Gillespie, 1973, 1974, 1975),
Gillespie pointed out that in some simple cases, we can approximate a predictive measure
of fitness using certain functions of expectation and variance. Philosophers have as a result
sometimes focused on variance as the mathematical property other than expectation which
3I suspect that writers on fitness sometimes forget that “expect” and “expectation” have no psychological
or predictive connotation in themselves. Thus one should not necessarily expect the “expected value” to
occur, e.g. for a bimodal distribution. (Consider drawing a ball from an urn with 1000 balls labeled “1”, one
labeled “2”, and 1000 more balls labeled “3”.)
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is relevant to fitness (Brandon, 1990; Sober, 2001). However, Gillespie’s claims about vari-
ance only concerned certain cases, and careful reading of some of Gillespie’s papers shows
that complex functions of higher statistical moments would be needed to provide a precise
definition of fitness in such cases.4 Beatty and Finsen (1989) gave an example in which
the third moment (skew) of two offspring distributions made a difference to fitness. The
distributions for A and B below have the same arithmetic mean, variance, and skew, but
B’s fourth moment (kurtosis) is greater and its geometric mean is smaller. The fact that
B’s geometric mean is slightly smaller shows that in experiments over several generations,
A would usually outreproduce B:
arith. geom.
# offspring: 1 2 3 4 5 mean variance skew kurtosis mean
probability for A: .2 .6 .2 3.0 .4 0 .4 2.930
probability for B: .05 .9 .05 3.0 .4 0 1.6 2.913
Moreover, for some cases, Gillespie’s analyses begins with approximating assumptions, so no
claim about what precise function fitness is would be implied.
Beatty and Finsen (1989) and Brandon (1990) considered defining fitness in terms of
long-term measures of success such as geometric mean number of offspring, Cooper’s (1984)
expected time to extinction, and Thoday’s (1953) probability of persistence 108 years. Bran-
don, however, argued that fitness can’t be defined by a long-term measure, because fitness
differences are supposed to reflect causes of evolution, and causes produce their effect over
(many) short-term periods: “Selection has no foresight; it has no means to discriminate
among organisms based on their long-term probability of having surviving offspring” (p.
4For example, it’s mentioned in the discussion at the bottom of page 1012 of (Gillespie, 1977) and it’s
implicit in the derivation of equation (7) on page 1013 that higher statistical moments can be relevant to
relative reproductive success. Gillespie argues that these moments typically make a small contribution to
fitness. He’s surely correct in this, but that doesn’t mean that higher moments never matter in practice,
and they certainly matter in principle.
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25). No doubt because mean and variance seem like respectable short-term properties, and
because Gillespie’s summaries used them, Brandon argued that fitness should be defined by
various functions of mean and variance in different contexts. In response, Sober (2001, p.
313) remarked that “long-term probabilities imply foresight no more than short-term prob-
abilities do”, but he gave little explanation of this remark. Sober also gave examples which
suggested that both short-term and long-term fitness measures might be useful. I agree with
both of Sober’s points, but I think that they can be further clarified and can be given a more
systematic foundation. This is part of what I try to do below.
3 Long-term short-term fitness
Notice that the worry that prompted Beatty and Finsen and Brandon to revise the original
expectation-based definition of fitness was that expected number of offspring sometimes
didn’t correspond to probable long-term success. Long-term success is clearly what matters
in some contexts. Moreover, Gillespie’s results, on which these authors had focused, were
actually of measure of fitness in terms of probable long-term success—approximated with
simple statistical functions such as expectation and variance. Also notice that an apparently
long-term measure like geometric mean in fact just captures a mathematical fact about
a short-term probability distribution over numbers of offspring. Even expected time to
extinction or probability of persistence 108 years can be considered mathematical property
of short-term probability distributions over numbers of offspring: Probabilities of changes
in frequencies over the long term are implied by short-term reproductive probabilities and
probabilities of other short-term probabilities. Let me explain.
To fix ideas, here is a relatively concrete example. Suppose we have a population of 3
A’s and 2 B’s and that reproduction is seasonal and asexual. For each number of offspring
there is a probability of producing that many offspring by an A, similarly for a B. There
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are several possible states of the population in the next generation, e.g. 6 A’s and 4 B’s;
0 of A and 1 of B, or 2 of B, or 3, or 4; extinction of the population; and so on. Each
state can result from the A’s and B’s producing numbers of offspring which add up to the
numbers of A’s and B’s corresponding to that state. Each state’s probability is thus implied
by probabilities of numbers of offspring. The same is true for more complex examples.
More generally, at each generation there is a set of transition probabilities P1(j|i), prob-
abilities the population will go into state j one generation later given state i in the current
generation. These 1-generation transition probabilities imply multiple-generation transition
probabilities.5 For example, the probability of going from i to k two generations after the
current generation is the sum, over all intermediate states j, of probabilities of going to j





Notice what this means: Short-term probabilities of numbers of offspring imply probabilities
of frequencies many generations later.6 Since probabilities of long-term success are implied by
short-term reproductive probabilities—the long-term probabilities are as it were contained
in the short-term probabilities—we can define fitness in terms of long-term probabilities,
considering them as specifying properties of short-term probability distributions. My illustra-
tion used discrete generations, but there are continuous-time models of similar phenomena,
and short-term probabilities would also plausibly imply long-term probabilities in the more
complex mathematical processes actually instantiated in nature. Thus Brandon’s problem
is solved. We don’t have to worry that long-term probabilities don’t seem to be able to be
involved in causing evolution, and we might have a single way of characterizing fitness.
Moreover, to the extent that fitness should reflect probabilities of long-term success, this
5For the present I assume that one-generation transition probabilities are the same in each generation,
because the environment is not changing, there is no frequency-dependence, etc. Section 5 relaxes this
assumption.
6See for example (Ewens, 2004; Grimmett and Stirzacker, 1992; Bharucha-Reid, 1960).
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perspective allows a general characterization of fitness regardless of how context determines
the relevant long-term probabilities: Fitness consists of whatever mathematical properties of
short-term probabilities imply probable long-term success. Fitness can be defined in terms of
long-term probabilities without losing short-term efficaciousness. In a slogan, fitness is:
Defined globally, but acts locally.
That is, fitness is defined in terms of probable long-term (“global”) effects, but accomplishes
them via short-term (“local”) effects—whose probabilities have the properties which consti-
tute fitness. We can call this long-term/short-term (LT/ST) fitness.
But how long is long enough? Surely not always Thoday’s 108 years. (What if the entire
population goes extinct before that time? All fitnesses would have been zero, and no natural
selection could have taken place.)
4 Interval-relative LT/ST fitness
Natural selection is supposed to cause (or at least explain) evolution, and fitness differences
are supposed to be an essential part of that cause. However, evolution over different intervals
of time should be seen as different evolutionary explananda, or more precisely as different
effects which might be caused by natural selection. That is, we should recognize that in
different situations, we are interested in questions about different effects—about evolution
over different intervals of time. But different causes may have different effects, and different
explananda can have different explanantia. Thus there is no reason to expect that fitness
could be defined without reference to an interval of time, and from the present perspective it
makes no sense to do so. We should talk of fitness relative to an interval of time I beginning
from a specified point in time t when a population is in a specified state. I’ll use the terms
“I-fitness”, “I-fitter”, etc. for fitness understood as relativized to an interval I in this way.
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In keeping with the arguments for long-term/short-term fitness, I suggest that fitness be
understood this way:
A type A is I-fitter than a type B if A has a greater probability of having increased
its frequency more (as a percentage of the frequency at t) than B at the end of
interval I which begins at t.
For example, A might be likely to increase its frequency over a long period of time I1, but
then exhaust a resource it needs and thus go extinct before the end of I2. In such a case A
might be I1-fitter than B but I2-less fit than B. (Note that this definition of “fitter than” is
consistent with an I-fitter type losing in a race against an I- less fit type over the interval
I; fitness differences in the present sense summarize facts about probabilistic outcomes and
should not be taken to guarantee any particular outcome.)
5 Short-term probabilities of what?
I argued above that we can understand fitness in terms of mathematical properties of proba-
bility distributions over numbers of offspring, even though those properties have implications
for evolution many generations hence. Ariew and Lewontin (2004), and Krimbas (2004) gave
a set of arguments that challenge even this possibility. These authors argued that different
short-term fitness measures are needed for various cases: sexual reproduction, niche con-
struction, overlapping generations, etc. Some of the Ariew/Lewontin/Krimbas arguments
seem to show that in some contexts fitness cannot be defined by a probability distribution
over offspring, or over grandoffspring, but rather distributions over many generations may
be needed to define fitness. What then are we to say about Brandon’s point that natural
selection has to act over the short term? I’ll consider some of the toughest cases raised by
Ariew and Lewontin and Krimbas, arguing that taking the relevant probabilities to be of
events in organisms’ lives rather than of numbers of descendants plausibly allows these cases
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to be handled by a sense of interval-relative fitness which is defined by short-term probabil-
ities. More detailed descriptions of these and other interesting cases can be found in (Ariew
and Lewontin, 2004; Krimbas, 2004).
Case 1: In a species with sexual reproduction, probabilities of numbers of grandoffspring
will depend on offspring’s mates as well parents’ number of offspring. Probabilities over
numbers of offspring thus don’t imply long-term probabilities; probabilities over number of
grandoffspring seem needed for this case. (This is so whether or not there is non-random mat-
ing.) However, probabilities of an offspring mating with organisms of various types depends
on each parent’s (short-term) probabilities of producing numbers of organisms of various
types along with the distribution of parent types in the population (and other probabilities
concerning mating preferences, where mating is non-random). For it is these factors which
determine probabilities of different frequencies of types in the generation in which offspring
mate. So probabilities of numbers of grandoffspring are implied by short-term probabilities,
although over a richer space of outcomes (offspring types must be distinguished) than con-
sidered earlier. Arguments like those given in Section 3 can then show that these short-term
probabilities imply long-term probabilities. Mathematical properties of the short-term prob-
abilities are defined by these long-term probabilities, and thus can constitute LT/ST interval-
relative fitness in terms of these properties. (Other cases such as frequency-dependence due
to epistatic interactions between loci can be handled in a similar manner.)
Case 2: Traits affecting parental investment, parent-provided developmental context,
and niche construction can indirectly affect probabilities of numbers of grandoffspring or
later descendants without affecting probabilities of numbers of offspring. Such cases thus
seem to require the basic “short-term” probabilities to be over numbers of grandoffspring
or later descendants—potentially dozens of generations later. However, a parent’s type
plausibly gives rise to a probability distribution over many possible events in its life (given
the makeup of its population and its environment). These probabilities include inter alia
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probabilities of numbers of offspring of various types, in various locations, etc., as well as
probabilities of offspring-aid events, niche construction activities, etc. This variety of short-
term probability (over a rich outcome space) thus implies probabilities of numbers of offspring
in future generations via effects produced by a current organism. Again it can be argued
that properties of such short-term distributions imply probabilities of long-term success, and
should thus constitute a long-term/short-term fitness relative to a given interval.
Case 3: Ariew and Lewontin (2004) point out that when generations overlap, probabilities
of long-term success can depend on whether the population size is increasing or decreasing.
Thus it seems that fitness cannot be defined except by reference to what the population
size is actually doing. Moreover, given that population changes are probabilistic, the way in
which a population size changes might not be determined by facts at a given time. Ariew
and Lewontin seem to suggest that in such cases fitness cannot be defined by short-term
probabilities, but instead must be derived from actual events over a relatively long period
of time. But this is incorrect. Probabilities of size change are implied by probabilities of
events in organisms’ lives such as those considered so far. (This can easily be seen from
the simple 5-organism population example in §3.) Moreover, mathematics of transition
probabilities for overlapping generations are well-known. Again probabilities of various multi-
generation evolutionary paths of the populations would be determined by strictly short-term
probabilities, so long-term/short-term fitnesses would again exist.
It thus seems plausible that interval-relative long-term/short-term fitness can be defined
in terms of probable outcomes at the end of an interval I, where the long-term probabilities
are implied by short-term probabilities of events in organisms’ lives in various generations.
The short-term transition probability distributions at various times need not be the same,
but later short-term distributions will be implied by earlier short-term distributions along
with initial conditions at the beginning of I. For it is the organisms at a given time which
create conditions for the population a short time later by interacting with the environment
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and producing offspring. (None of this need be true when environmental change is caused by
factors beyond of the population in question, but that is no strike against the present view,
since it’s generally agreed that fitness should be sensitive to such environmental changes.)
6 Conclusion
6.1 Comparative fitness
The view which results from the preceding remarks can be be summarized as follows:
• A type A is I-fitter that B if A has a greater probability of having increased its frequency
more than B at the end of the interval I, where the relevant long-term probabilities
are implied by short-term, 1-generation probabilities over certain events in organisms’
lives.
• The relevant interval for I-fitness is the interval over which a chosen evolutionary effect
takes place.
• That fitness is constituted by short-term probabilities means that it concerns events
which act over the short-term.
• Fitness is measurable in principle, but estimated in practice. Models and sampling
techniques for aspects of preceding exist.
This provides a unified characterization of what it is for one type to be fitter than another.
For a given population, there is, of course, a different fitness property for each interval I,
but it should be clear now that this is what we should expect for different evolutionary ef-
fects/explananda. The present view differs from the earlier views discussed above (Brandon,
1990; Sober, 2001; Ariew and Lewontin, 2004; Krimbas, 2004) which, in various ways, allowed
fitness properties to be disparate and without systematic relation to each other. Note that if
the relevant short-term probabilities are causal (as they would be if they were propensities),
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the present approach can help support a view of natural selection as a single kind of cause
of evolution.
I want to suggest one possible further development of this view. First, notice that what
makes the overlapping generations case different from those considered earlier that it requires
a probability distribution over times at which a parent produces offspring. More generally,
sequencing and timing of events in relation to changes of states of the environment can
matter to probabilities of future proliferation. Second, I suggest, but will not argue here,
that an environment should be viewed as defining a probability distribution over conditions
that members of a given population might experience during the interval of time I over which
fitness is to be calculated. This is to treat an environment as the environment for an entire
population rather than for a specific organism.7 These considerations suggest that the basic
short-term probabilities which constitute fitness should be probabilities of sets of sequences
of possible events—both organismic and environmental—in the life of an organism of a given
type. We can call these sequences of events “organism-environment histories”.
6.2 Population dynamics
The definition of “fitter than” given above does not resolve all what-function questions about
fitness. Although the definition can be used to define a sense of comparative fitness over
very short intervals I, understanding short-term dynamics usually calls for a fitness degree
property. Measures of relative strength of fitnesses are also relevant to some questions about
long-term evolution; we may, for example, want to know not only which type will probably
go to fixation, but also how fast it is likely to do so.
In such cases the condition to be caused, explained, or predicted is more precise than the
question of which type will probably increase its frequency more, etc., and the relevant notion
7See (Abrams, 2007b) for a characterization of environments which is broadly consistent with the present
view of fitness.
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of fitness should reflect that fact. We shouldn’t expect, however, that there is one scalar
fitness property which can be taken to be the property which objectively drives all short-term
dynamics. For what really drives short-term dynamics is the set of full moment-to-moment
transition probability distributions for members of a population, rather than sequences of
summary statistics such as expectations. The full set of transition probability distributions
imply a probability distribution over all possible sequences of frequency and population size
changes over an interval of time. Then we have to decide what kind of summary property
of the latter distribution is of interest to us. Scalar time-indexed fitness properties can
be relevant to prediction/explanation/causation of dynamics, but only relative to a precise
specification of what is to be predicted/explained/etc. Thus, for example, the common use
of expected number of offspring to model short-term dynamics is in fact ideal for answering
one particular question: What is the the path of the average population state through the
space of possible relative frequencies of types? However, that is only one of many simple
questions one might ask about population dynamics.
These last remarks might make one conclude that the notion of fitness is far less unified
than is suggested by the rest of the paper. Such a conclusion seems premature. For my
remarks suggest only that, as in the rest of the paper, a causal and explanatory property
going by the name of “fitness” must be relative to the effect to be caused or explained. I’ve
explained how to provide a systematic characterization of comparative fitness relativized to
intervals of time. There is at present no reason to think that the tools developed for that
purpose cannot be used as the basis of a systematic characterization of fitness for a broader
range of evolutionary effects.
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